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THE CLOSING OF THE GOLDEN DOOR: NECESSITY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FREEDOM OF RELIGION ARE
FAILING AS DEFENSES FOR SANCTUARY MOVEMENT
WORKERS
I.

INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY

Victor Walter Garcia Ortiz left El Salvador and came to the United
States.' In September 1980, he was deported from Los Angeles and returned to El Salvador.2 In November 1981, he was killed by the Salvadoran National Police.3 Santana Chirino Amayo was deported back to El
Salvador in June 1981.' In September 1981, his body was found, tortured
and decapitated.5 Jose Umberto Santacruz Elias was returned to El Salvador in January 1981.6 He has not been heard from since.7 Octavio Osequeda, who was returned to El Salvador on July 12, 1982, was killed on
July 13, 1982 by special police.8
Victor, Santana, Jose and Octavio were just four of many thousands of
Salvadorans, between 1980 and 1986, who were forced to return to El Salvador after having been denied asylum in the United States.9 They returned to a civil war in their country which had been responsible for the
deaths of over 60,000 Salvadoran civilians between 1979 and 1986.10
The United States immigration policy governs the admissions of these
Salvadorans, and all aliens, into the country. It mandates a procedure by
which an alien who has already entered the country can apply for asylum.' Asylum may be granted at the United States' Attorney General's
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Interview with Rev. John Fife, 14 Catholic Agitator, Aug. 1984 at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

9. R. GOLDEN & M. McCONNELL, SANcTuARY: THE NEW UNDERGROUND RAILROAD 43 (1986).
Estimates in 1981 alone state that this country returned 10,500 Salvadorans to El Salvador.
Id.
10. Comment, Helping Those Who Help the Sojourner Among Us: Viable Defenses for
Members of the Sanctuary Movement, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 135, 137 (1987).
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988) provides:

The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an
the United States or at a land border or port of entry,
status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted
the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines
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discretion. 12 A special inquiry officer, who has the authority to exclude an
alien, presides over the procedure. 13 An "excluded" alien has a right of
appeal to the Attorney General for a determination of refugee status. 4
Refugee status enables an alien to remain in the United States, but the
limitations set upon the number of immigrants allowed to enter the country force the Attorney General to categorize certain refugees.' 5 Central
Americans, having been designated "economic" refugees, as opposed to
"political" refugees, are among the largest groups to be deported.1 6
American religious and public organizations have recognized that immigration laws do little to help Central American refugees. Some of these
groups began the Sanctuary Movement, a system through which members
assist refugees' 17 entry into the United States. Rev. John Fife of the Tucson, Arizona Southside Presbyterian Church and Quaker Jim Corbett are
credited with founding the Sanctuary Movement in 1982.18 Southside
12. Id. § 1158.
13. Id. § 1226.
14. Id. § 1226(b).
15. Id. § 1151(a). This code section limits the total number of immigrants allowed per
year.
16. While the total number of immigrants is limited each year, the number of refugees is
not. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(2) (1988) provides:
"[T]he number of refugees who may be admitted under this section ... shall be such number as the President determines, before the beginning of the fiscal year and after appropriate consultation, is justified by humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in the national
interest."
The "humanitarian" concern mandated by this code section is often translated to mean a
"political" refugee, which includes those refugees from East Asia, Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union. Schmidt, Refuge in the United States: The Sanctuary Movement Should
Use the Legal System, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 79, 80 (1986); cf. Anaya, Sanctuary: Because
There are Many Who Wait for Death, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 106-07 (1986) ("[c]ertainly
there is more persecution of union members in El Salvador than there is of Chinese tennis
players; obviously there is more persecution of Guatemalan Indians than of Russian ballet
stars. Yet it is much, much easier for the tennis players and ballet stars to qualify as 'refugees' than it is for the peasants and Indians").
The INS 1983 record of granting asylum confirms this differential pattern. Political
asylum claims made by refugees from Afghanistan were 82 percent successful, from
Iran 72 percent successful, and from Poland almost 30 percent successful. From El
Salvador, where fifty-five thousand persons were killed in three years, only 2 percent
of the claims for political asylum based on fear of persecution were granted. The
reason the INS gives for its refusal to grant political asylum is that Central Americans are not political refugees but only economic refugees.
R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, supra note 9, at 44. An economic refugee is one who desires to
live in the United States, not from a fear of persecution in his own country, but from a
desire to take advantage of available job opportunities and state and federal assistance
programs.
17. The Sanctuary Movement assists refugees from such countries as El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. See generally R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, supra note 9 (discussing
the Movement's history and purpose).
18. E.g., R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, supra note 9, at 37; Comment, supra note 10, at
143; Comment, The Sanctuary Movement: An Analysis of the Legal and Moral Questions
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Presbyterian Church's congregation began helping Central American refugees by raising bond money to secure their release from detention. 9 As
the congregation housed refugees during deportation hearings, members
of the church became personally involved. By October 1981, the congregation had become so committed to obeying moral and religious values by
assisting the refugees that the church elders voted to publicly
declare the
0
church a sanctuary for refugees from Central America.2
By April 1986, Jim Corbett alone had helped conduct safe passage to
700 refugees, 2 and thousands of others passed into this country through
the Tucson Southside Presbyterian Church. 2 ' Yet, the Southside Presbyterian Church is not alone in its participation in the Sanctuary Movement. Many other religious, civic, and public organizations quickly rallied
to give their support. These groups include Methodist, Presbyterian, and
Catholic churches, Jewish synagogues, a Trappist monk, an Amerindian
tribe, and a farm collective. 23 The movement counts among its members
individuals throughout the Rio Grande Valley, Colorado, Nebraska, Mexico, New York, Kansas, Iowa, Wisconsin, California, and Washington,

D.C. 24 In 1984, the number of sanctuaries in the United States was esti-

mated to be 3,00025 with approximately 240-300 having publicly declared
their commitment by 1985.26
The Sanctuary Movement is patterned after the underground railroad
which helped American slaves to freedom in the nineteenth century, and
the European underground of churches that saved the lives of numerous
Jewish refugees during World War II. It is based on the Sanctuary Movement workers' beliefs in their freedom of religion, the United States' inInvolved, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1221, 1224 (1986) [hereinafter Comment, An Analysis].
19. 14 Catholic Agitator, supra note 1, at 1.
20. Id. Rev. Fife, stressing that the movement is religious and not political, stated that
the movement began quietly, but when it became apparent that the laws of the United
States were in conflict with the laws of religion and morality, the church decided to publi-

cize its decision to offer sanctuary. Id.
21. R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, supra note 9, at 59.

22. Id. at 47.
23. Id. at 52-53.
24. Id.

25. Id. at 53.
26. Comment, An Analysis, supra note 18, at 1224; The Sanctuary Movement: A Survey
of Recent Litigation, 2 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 214 (1987) [hereinafter Survey of Recent Litigation]. A statement from the United Methodist Church is an example of the public statements issued by sanctuary-giving organizations:

The United Methodist Church mandates its congregations to do justice and to resist
the policy of the Immigration and Naturalization Service by declaring their churches
to be sanctuaries for refugees from El Salvador, Guatemala, and other areas of the
Caribbean and Central America. It urges the U.S. to follow the United Nations definition of refugees.
UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, BOOK OF RESOLUTIONS OF GENERAL CONFERENCE,

(1984), reprinted in R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, supra note 9, at 123.

June 1984,
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ternational treaty obligations to help refugees, and the necessity of saving
thousands of Central Americans lives. Yet these beliefs fail as a defense
to the prosecution of Sanctuary workers. This Note will examine three
prevalent defenses used by Sanctuary workers; freedom of religion, necessity, and international law. It will outline the general theory of each defense, examine how each has failed in Sanctuary cases, and suggest how
each might be successfully used by Sanctuary defendants.
II.

THE SANCTUARY CASES

While Sanctuary workers are motivated by the altruistic goal of gaining
temporary asylum until it is safe for Guatemalans and Salvadorans to return home,27 their actions violate certain United States laws. 28 The
United States government at first declined to acknowledge the severity of
the Sanctuary Movement, 29 but eventually arrests were made and indictments delivered.
The first Sanctuary trial, in 1985, was that of Stacey Lynn Merkt, in
United States v. Merkt (Merkt 1).3 Merkt worked at the Casa Oscar Romero in San Benito, Texas, which supplied food and homes to Central
American refugees with the aid of area churches.2 1 Merkt was arrested
for, and convicted of, conspiring to transport, aiding and abetting the
transport of, and transporting two illegal aliens, 32 whom she was driving
to the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") office in San
Antonio, Texas when she was arrested. Merkt was sentenced to ninety
27. 14 Catholic Agitator, supra note 1, at 1. Temporary resident status is currently allowed if an alien meets certain requirements. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)(1988). General permanent
asylum is allowed under procedures set by the discretion of the Attorney General. Id. §
1158(a); see supra note 11.
28. "It shall be unlawful for any person, .. to bring to the United States from any place
outside thereof. . . any alien who does not have an unexpired visa; if a visa was required
under this chapter or regulations issued thereunder." 8 U.S.C. § 1323(a)(1988). This code
provision defines the crime of bringing in certain aliens. Section 1324(a)(1) lists the criminal
penalties for an individual who brings an alien into the United States, harbors an alien, or
transports an alien to help the alien avoid detection. Id. § 1324(a)(1). Sanctuary workers
have also been prosecuted for violating conspiracy laws and aiding and abetting laws. 18
U.S.C. § 371 (1988) (conspiracy); Id. .§ 2 (aiding and abetting).
29. "Certain arrests could have taken place if we would have wanted to, but we felt the
government would end up looking ridiculous, especially as far as going into church property- anything where ethics involved would be questioned." Statement of Leon Ring, Chief
of Tucson Division of Border Patrol (Dec. 25, 1982). R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, supra
note 9, at 47, reprinted from Medlin, Underground RailroadStill Runs in the Open, Ariz.
Daily Star, Dec. 25, 1982.
30. 764 F.2d 266, reh'g denied en banc, 772 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1985).
31. Id. at 268; see also 14 Catholic Agitator, supra note 1, at 2.
32. Merkt, 764 F.2d at 268-69; see also R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, supra note 9, at 58;
18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371; 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (supra note 28). Both of Merkt's Salvadoran
passengers had received death threats in El Salvador, and had lost family members and coworkers to the violence there. 14 Catholic Agitator, supra note 1, at 2.
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days in prison, but this was suspended and replaced by two years of supervised probation."
On March 17, 1983, Philip Conger was the second Sanctuary worker to
be arrested. Conger, like John Fife, was a member of the Tucson Southside Presbyterian Church, 34 and like Merkt, was arrested for transporting
undocumented aliens.3 5 The state dropped charges against Conger when
the judge found border patrol agents lacked probable cause to stop Con3
ger's car.
In April, 1984, Jack Elder was the next Sanctuary worker to be charged
37
with transporting undocumented aliens, in United States v. Elder.
Elder drove three Salvadorans from the Casa Oscar Romero to a bus station in Harlingen, Texas, where they were detained by border patrol
agents who observed the group disembarking from their bus.38 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas refused to
grant Elder's motion to dismiss, 9 but a jury acquitted him of all
charges.'
The next Sanctuary trial resulted in a guilty verdict against Lornita R.
Thomas, who was convicted of concealing an alien in her car."1 Thomas
was sentenced to two years in prison after stating that she would not
2
cease her work in the Sanctuary Movement.4
While Stacey Merkt was on probation for her first arrest, and John
Elder awaited his trial, both were charged with conspiring to bring in additional aliens and transporting aliens, in United States v. Merkt (Merkt
II). 3 In this incident Elder drove two Salvadorans from the Mexican border to Casa Oscar Romero where they met Merkt, who drove them to
McAllen, Texas and helped them to buy bus tickets.4 4 Both Elder and
45
Merkt were convicted.
33. Merkt, 764 F.2d at 269-70; see also Altemus, The Sanctuary Movement, 9 WHITTIER
L. REV. 683, 707 (1988).

34. Survey of Recent Litigation,supra note 26, at 217; 14 Catholic Agitator, supra note 1,
at 1.
35. Survey of Recent Litigation, supra note 26, at 217.
36. Altemus, supra note 33, at 707; Survey of Recent Litigation, supra note 26, at 217.
37. 601 F. Supp 1574 (S.D. Tex. 1985); Altemus, supra note 33, at 708; Comment, An
Analysis, supra note 18, at 1226; Survey of Recent Litigation, supra note 26, at 217.
38. Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1576; Altemus, supra note 33, at 708; see also Comment, An
Analysis, supra note 18, at 1226; Survey of Recent Litigation, supra note 26, at 217.
39. Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1581.
40. Altemus, supra note 33, at 709; Comment, An Analysis, supra note 18, at 1226.
41. Survey of Recent Litigation, stipra note 26, at 218.
42. Id.
43. 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987); Survey of Recent
Litigation, supra note 26, at 218-19.
44. Merkt, 794 F.2d at 953.
45. Id. at 964-65; Altemus, supra note 33, at 709; Survey of Recent Litigation,supra note
26, at 219 (Both defendants received prison sentences but were freed pending appeal. The
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Finally, in January 1985, the United States arrested over sixty Sanctuary workers; the government indicted sixteen and ultimately convicted
eight in United States v. Aguilar." Aguilar differs from Merkt I, Elder,
and Merkt 11 in that the arrests in Aguilar were achieved after the government used paid informants to infiltrate Arizona churches and sanctuary groups in Mexico. 47 These informants tape-recorded hundreds of conversations among the church members and identified Sanctuary
48
workers.
The government's improper use of sending undercover agents to spy on
church congregations was just one of the defenses used in Aguilar.49 The
defense also argued lack of intent, mistake of law, 50 selective prosecution,51 necessity,52 international treaty obligations of the United States to
aid refugees, 53 and freedom of religion. 54 Of these defenses, necessity, international law obligations, and freedom of religion are most frequently
used in Sanctuary cases.
court later reduced Elder's sentence.)
46. 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Socorro Pardo v. United States, 59
U.S.L.W. 3481 (1991); Altemus, supra note 33, at 710.
47. Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 668; Altemus, supra note 33, at 711.
48. Altemus, supra note 33, at 711.
49. Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 696-705.
50. Id. at 671-76. The defendants in Aguilar, and Stacey Merkt in Merkt 1I claimed that
they believed the Salvadorans they were helping were refugees under the Refugee Act of
1980. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C.). If the Salvadorans were refugees under this Act, they would have automatically
been allowed to stay, at least temporarily, in the United States, without being designated
"illegal aliens." If they were not illegal aliens, then the Sanctuary workers would not have
been violating immigration laws by aiding them. This is the crux of the mistake of law
defense.
The lack of requisite intent defense was based on the similar argument that if the workers
thought they were helping legitimate refugees, not harboring illegal aliens, they had no intent to break the laws which prohibited transporting, aiding, and concealing aliens. The lack
of intent defense was recognized by the Supreme Court in Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246 (1952). In Morissette, the defendant was charged with stealing government property under 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1988). He salvaged several tons of spent bomb casings from a
bombing range. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 247. Morissette argued that since he believed that
the casings had been abandoned by the government, he did not have the intent to steal
government property when he took them. Id. at 248-49. Finding that intent is always an
element of theft-related crimes, the Supreme Court held that the existence of intent is always a question of fact for the jury to decide. Id. at 274. The Court ultimately reversed
Morissette's conviction, since the jury in the trial court had not been allowed to determine if
Morissette had acted with the requisite malicious intent. Id. at 276.
51. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 705-08 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nor.
Socorro Pordo v. United States, 59 U.S.L.W. 3481 (1991).
52. Id. at 692-96.
53. Id. at 679-80.
54. Id. at 687.
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III. NECESSITY
A.

General Application of Necessity Defense

The defense of necessity, duress, or justification mitigates punishment
or allows an acquittal for a defendant who admits having performed an
unlawful act.5' It is a common law
defense,56 which has been statutorily
57
recognized, in many jurisdictions.
A defendant using necessity or duress as a defense must prove that he
acted unlawfully to prevent a greater evil from occurring. The elements of
the defense are: (1) the immediate threat of a harm, such as death or
serious bodily injury, which would be a greater harm than that caused by
the unlawful act committed by the defendant; (2) the defendant's reasonable belief that the harm actually will occur if he does not act unlawfully;
and (3) lack of a reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm
without committing an unlawful act.5 8 In examining the elements more
closely, it becomes apparent that the actor must believe his conduct is
necessary to avoid harm of a greater magnitude than the harm caused by
his act.59 At trial, the jury must weigh the defendant's belief against this
reasonable opportunity to avoid committing an unlawful act.
The need for a jury to determine whether duress exists in a particular
case was affirmed in United States v. Contento-Pachon" ContentoPachon had been arrested for smuggling cocaine from Columbia to the
United States in balloons he had swallowed."' He stated that he concealed the cocaine because the owner of the cocaine had threatened to kill
him and his family if he refused. 2 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that Contento-Pachon's evidence was sufficient to suggest the existence of duress,
and therefore, the evidence should have been presented
3
to the jury.
55. Luckstead, Choice of Evils Defenses in Texas: Necessity, Duress, and Public Duty,
10 AM. J. CRnm. L. 179 (1982); see generally F. INBAu, A MOENSSENS & J. THOMPSON, CASES
AND COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL LAW 671-87 (4th ed. 1987) (discussion of the necessity defense).
56. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409-11 (1985); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 comment 1 (1985).
57. E.g., Thx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.22 (Vernon 1989); Luckstead, supra note 55, at 179.
58. United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1984); see MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02; Luckstead, supra note 55, at 184-87.
59. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 comment 2; cf. Luckstead, supra note 55, at 191 (the necessity defense usually fails in civil disobedience cases because the actor's belief in the necessity of his actions must be a reasonable belief, not a religious or moral one).
60. 723 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1984).
61. Id. at 693.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 694. While the court allowed the use of a duress defense, it precluded a necessity defense because of a traditional common law distinction between the two defenses.
Under the common law, duress was only available when the evil sought to be prevented was
produced by a human threat, and necessity was an available excuse only when the evil was
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Contento-Pachon met the first element-a threat of imminent
harm-by proving the cocaine owner had threatened him and his family."4 He satisfied the second element-a well-grounded fear that the
threat would be carried out-by proving that the owner knew his family's
home address.6 5 He fulfilled the third element-no reasonable alternative
to acting illegally-by testifying that he believed the police in Bogota,
Columbia were corrupt."' Additionally, the court commented that on occasion a defendant would be required to prove a fourth element-that the
wrongdoer turned himself in to authorities as soon as possible. The court
noted, however, that this element was required only in prison escape
67
cases.
The most difficult element of the necessity defense for a defendant to
establish is that he was faced with an emergency. In People v. Patrick,8
the defense failed to establish that the defendant did indeed face an
emergency. In Patrick, the defendant was charged with kidnapping and
false imprisonment after he abducted a young woman, a member of a
cult, allegedly to "deprogram" her.6 9 Because, the woman was not in the
cult's custody at the time of her abduction, the court decided there was
no threat of imminent harm to be avoided by the abduction. 0
Another element of the necessity defense which is difficult to prove is
the absence of any reasonable, legal alternative course of action. Proof of
this element is often missing in cases of political protest."' For instance,
caused by forces of nature. Id. at 695. The Supreme Court, however, has held that the distinction between duress and necessity has been nearly extinguished today. United States v.
Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1985). But see MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.09, 3.02 (1962) (adhering
to the distinction between duress and necessity as caused by human and natural forces,
respectively).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. This fourth element-that wrongdoers turn themselves into the authorities as
soon as possible-was the basis for the conviction of four federal prison escapes. Bailey, 444
U.S. at 412-14. While the defendants in Bailey may have been able to prove the necessity of
their escape from prison by providing testimony of prison conditions, they would have been
unable to justify why they remained in hiding for several months after their escape, instead
of going to governmental authorities. Id. The defendants' necessity defense failed because
there was a legal alternative to hiding and that was to turn themselves over to authorities.
Id.
68. 126 Cal. App. 3d 952, 179 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1981).
69. Id. at 956, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 279.
70. Id. at 960, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 281-82.
71. See United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1985) (defendant broke into Vandenburg Air Force Base to spray paint slogans protesting nuclear war and world starvation);
United States v. Seward, 687 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Ahrendt v.
United States, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983) (nuclear war protestors arrested for trespassing at a
Colorado nuclear plant); United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1972) (defendant
attempted to destroy Selective Service records after breaking into a Minnesota Selective
Service office).
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in United States v. Kroncke,7 2 the defendant, in protest against the Vietnam War, burglarized a Minnesota Selective Service office to destroy Selective Service records.73 The court held the necessity defense failed because the defendant had the reasonable, legal alternative of applying to
the political system to end the war. 4 Political processes were also offered
as a legal alternative in United States v. Quilty.7 5 The defendants in
Quilty were charged with trespassing at the Rock Island arsenal in order
to hold a prayer meeting to protest nuclear arms. 7 6 While the court noted

that nuclear war is a more serious harm than a peaceful prayer meeting,
it denied the necessity defense because the political process was a legal
and reasonable alternative.7

B. Necessity as a Defense in the Sanctuary Cases
No Sanctuary worker attempted to use the necessity defense until
Aguilar, and even there it proved unsuccessful. In Aguilar, the court
granted the prosecutor's motion in limine to exclude all testimony and
evidence which made any direct or indirect reference to the necessity of
the Sanctuary Movement.7" Despite the court's ruling, necessity still may
72. 459 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1972).

73. Id. at 698.
74. Id. at 701-04.
75. 741 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1984).
76. Id. at 1032.
77. Id. at 1033.
78. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 693 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom.
Socovro Pardo v. United States, 59 U.S.L.W. 5481 (1991); Altemus, supra note 33, at 713;
Colbert, The Motion in Limine: Trial Without a Jury, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5, 49, 66 (1986).
The motion in limine is a pretrial motion made to prevent the introduction of potentially
prejudicial and irrelevant evidence. Gamble, The Motion in Limine: A PretrialProcedure
That Has Come of Age, 33 ALA. L. RE v. 1, 1-2 (1981); Lerner, The Motion in Limine: A
Useful Trial Tool, 4 TRIAL DIPL. J. 14, 14-15 (Spring 1981); Rodin, The Motion in Limine:
Its Uses and Abuses, 65 CHi. B. REc. 230 (1984). The purposes of the motion in limine are
to narrow the issues, educate the judge, and identify certain pieces of evidence which may
prejudice or confuse the jury. Gamble, supra, at 3, 8; Lerner, supra, at 15; Rodin, supra, at
231-32. It is an evidence-excluding instrument which evolved through case law and is not
statutorily defined. Rodin, supra, at 230. It is, however, supported by procedural and evidentiary rules. FED. R. EVID. 403 (allowing a judge to exclude prejudicial evidence at his
discretion); FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (pre-trial conference); FED. R. CaIM. P. 12 (pleadings and
motions before trial).
The motion in limine granted in Aguilar excluded all evidence which directly or indirectly
depicted conditions in El Salvador, and therefore completely eliminated the necessity defense. Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 693; see also Altemus, supra note 33, at 713. Many commentators, however, have urged that
[t]he motion in limine is not designed to prevent the opposing party from presenting
legitimate defenses simply because they may be harmful to the moving party...
The motion is not a means to eliminate harmful evidence; rather, it is a means to
eliminate the admittance of prejudicial evidence which would constitute error.
Rodin, supra, at 234. If this advice had been followed in Aguilar, the court would have
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be a viable defense in Sanctuary cases.
To establish the first element of necessity, a Sanctuary worker must
show that the harm to refugees who remain in El Salvador is imminent
and outweighs the harm done by workers assisting the refugees to enter
the United States. While the harm created by workers who help persecuted persons to escape danger is not severe, the harms threatened to the
refugees-torture, rape, abduction, and murder-are very great.7 9 Sanctuary workers must also establish that the harm was imminent and that
they had a reasonable belief that the harm would occur if they did not act
unlawfully by helping the refugees to safety. In light of the staggering
death statistics in Central America, it seems unlikely that a judge could
legitimately deny the immediacy of the threatened harm.
If defense counsel were allowed to present this evidence it is likely that
a Sanctuary defendant could establish the necessity defense or would at
least be able to present his case to the jury. The court in Aguilar, however, excluded evidence that would best demonstrate the immediacy and
allowed testimony about Salvadoran conditions. While the descriptions may have been gruesome, they are central to the defense and should not have been excluded as prejudicial.
The motion in limine should be very specific, and "its scope should be more like that of a
rifle than a shotgun. . . ." Gamble, supra, at 10-11; Rodin, supra, at 234. The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has stated that "[o]rders in limine which exclude broad categories of evidence should rarely be employed. A better practice is to deal with questions of
admissibility of evidence as they arise." Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 519 F.2d
708, 712 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975). The judge in Aguilar then, instead of
barring any evidence relative to Central American cruelty, could at least have permitted the
admission into evidence of the death and asylum-denial statistics, and even some limited
testimony from Salvadorans, since he could have excluded graphic descriptions of abuse and
death if he felt such individual facts were too prejudicial.
The use of the motion in limine to bar an entire defense may, in fact, violate a defendant's right to trial by jury. Cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to have a jury
decide the facts of a case); U.S. CONST. art. III § 2 (right to trial by jury). In Aguilar, use of
the motion may also have violated the attorney work-product privilege because the defense
attorney was forced to prepare a brief in response to the government's motion in limine. In
its responsive brief, the defense explained its theory of defense in order to persuade the
judge to allow the presentation of relevant evidence. The preparation of a defense is protected as privileged, since it is work prQduct. Cf. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-512
(1947) (work product is privileged). Though privileged information is not available to opposing parties through discovery, the prosecution in Aguilar was allowed access to much of
Aguilar's attorney's work product prior to trial, since defense counsel, in effect, was forced
to argue part of its defense in its responsive brief. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37 (discovery in
general), 26(b)(1) (privileged information is not discoverable); FED. R CRIM. P. 16 (discovery
in general).
For an extensive examination of the motion in limine and its paralyzing effect in Aguilar,
see Colbert, supra.
79. For a detailed description of the actual treatment of Salvadorans and Guatemalans in
their home countries, see R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, supra note 9; A. CRITTENDEN, SANCTUARY: A STORY OF AMERICAN CONSCIENCE AND THE LAW IN COLLISION (1988), D. MATAS, THE
SANCTUARY TRIAL (1989); M. DAVIDSON, CONVICTIONS OF THE HEART: JIM CORBETT AND THE
SANCTUARY MOVEMENT (1988).
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severity of the threat to the refugees: testimony regarding the impact of
war in their home countries, and the conditions resulting therefrom. 0 For
a case to go to a jury, the defense must simply establish the prima facie
elements of the necessity defense. 8' However, if the defense is precluded
from presenting evidence demonstrating the immediacy and severity of
the harm, this defense will not be available.
Sanctuary workers also need to present this evidence to establish the
reasonableness of their actions, otherwise their motives will appear purely
religious and moral. In political protest, the necessity defense is often denied because moral and religious motives are not considered to be
reasonable."'
While the government has stated that testimony of conditions in El
Salvador is "irrelevant and prejudicial to the prosecution's theory... Mp3
such testimony should be allowed at trial because the conditions in Central America are the very reason for the Sanctuary Movement. It is not
merely a case of alien-smuggling, as argued by the prosecution in the
Sanctuary cases, but it is an attempt to provide those persecuted with a
better life."4
Not only would the presentation of such evidence allow the Sanctuary
workers to properly present their case, but also it would have the additional effect of educating the American public about events in Central
America."' If the conditions in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras
were better-known, a judge might take judicial notice of them." The
harm threatened would then be easier to establish, and could lead to a
successful use of the necessity defense. One federal court has, in fact,
80. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
81. United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 430 (9th Cir. 1985).
82. Cf. Luckstead, supra note 55, at 191.
83. Colbert, supra note 78, at 52.
84. Cf. United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574, 1579 (S.D. Tex. 1985) (denying Elder's
freedom of religion claim because "[t]he consciences of others religiously motivated may
conclude that the starving and impoverished of North Africa, Asia or Mexico are equally
entitled to enter this country without review by the INS").
85. Comment, supra note 10, at 152.
86. The Federal Rules of Evidence state:
(b) kinds of facts
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is
either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
(c) when discretionary
A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not.
(d) when mandatory
A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the
necessary information.
FED. R EVID. § 201(b)-(d).
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taken such judicial notice in Orantes-Hernandesv. Meese.s7
Publicizing the torture and cruelty in Central America would also have
the effect of making INS officials better able to question refugees in hearings to determine asylum."' If refugee status were determined in these
preliminary hearings, the workers in the Sanctuary Movement would not
be forced to break the law.
Sanctuary workers would also be able to establish the final element of
necessity-that there was no legal, reasonable alternative to their unlawful act-by presenting evidence concerning the statistics of Central Americans who are refused asylum."' As in the political protest cases, the government would probably answer a necessity argument in Sanctuary cases
by asserting that the political system is the proper alternative to the act
of aiding aliens.8 0 If defendants were allowed to show that the deaths and
tortures are occurring at a rate far greater than the INS rate of granting
asylum, Sanctuary workers could argue that the political process, though
legal, is not a reasonable alternative.9 1 The political process remains an

-

87. 685 F. Supp. 1488 (D.C. Cal. 1988), aff'd sub nor. Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh,
919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990).
The Court, having received and considered the evidence presented, having heard
the testimony of witnesses, and having heard the arguments of counsel . . . makes
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
8. A substantial number of Salvadorans who flee El Salvador and enter the United
States possess good faith claims to asylum pursuant to United States asylum laws
and the Refugee Act of 1980.
9. A substantial number of Salvadorans who flee El Salvador possess a well-founded
fear of persecution pursuant to United States asylum laws and the Refugee Act of
1980.
10. People from a wide cross-section of Salvadoran society suffer human rights
abuses. Trade unionists, members of farmworker unions and cooperatives, religious
workers, human rights activists, refugee relief workers, members of student of political organizations, people suspected of opposition to the government or of being sympathetic to the opposition, and family members and associates of those involved have
been particularly subject to abuses.
11. The form of the persecution includes the following: arbitrary arrest, short term
detention, torture including use of electric shock, capucha, beatings, rape, "disappearance," extra-judicial executions, abductions, threats against family members, intimidation, forced ingestion of food, false imprisonment, mock-executions, sleep deprivation, mass-killings, and forced relocations.
12. The persecutors are primarily Salvadoran military and security forces which include the Policia de Hacienda (Treasury Police), Policia Nacional (National Police),
GuardiaNacional (National Guard), as well as the paramilitary Brigadasde Defensa
Civil (Civil Defense Patrols), and the patrullas contonales (canton patrols).
685 F. Supp. at 1490-92.
88. Altemus, supra note 33, at 716; see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
91. The government has countered such an argument with the statement that political
protestors cannot use their "impatience" as a defense. See United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d
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unreasonable alternative because applying for asylum or refugee status is
not preventing the thousands of abuses in Central America.
IV.

A.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

General Applications of InternationalLaw

In addition to the necessity defense, Sanctuary workers have also argued that their actions are justified because the United States is violating
international law by refusing to grant asylum to refugees from Central
America.9 2 In 1951, the United Nations produced its Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees ("1951 Convention").9 This treaty defined "refugee" to mean "any person who:. . . owing to well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality. . . . ,,4 The 1951 Convention then stated that "[no]' Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would
be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group or political opinion.' 95
The United States was not a party to the 1951 Convention,96 but in
1968 it became a signatory to the United Nations Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees ("1967 Protocol")."' The 1967 Protocol incorporated
the definition of refugee and reaffirmed the other provisions of the 1951
Convention.
The United States Constitution makes international treaties which
have been signed by the United States "the supreme Law of the Land."9 9
Only self-executing treaties, however, are actually held to be United
427, 431 (9th Cir. 1985).
92. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub. nom.
Socorro Pardo v. United States, 59 U.S.L.W. 3481 (1991); United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d
950, 964 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987); United States v. Elder, 601 F.
Supp. 1574, 1581 (S.D. Tex. 1985).
93. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6259, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, at 37, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
94. Id., ch. I, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6261, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 at 39, 189 U.N.T.S. at 152.
95. Id. ch. V, art. 33, 19 U.S.T. at 6276, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 at 54, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
96. See Schmidt, supra note 16, at 90.
97. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
98. 1967 Protocol, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 at 3, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268-70;
see Cox, "Well-Founded Fear of Being Persecuted": The Sources and Application of a
Criterion of Refugee Status, 10 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 333 n.4 (1984); Schmidt, supra note
16, at 90; Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States Law, 80 COLUm. L. REv. 1125,
1126 (1980).
99. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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States law, 100 and neither of these two United Nations documents were
self-executing. 1 1 Because the 1967 Protocol was not self-executing, Congress would have to specifically legislate to make it or any of its provisions law. Congress did legislate to include the United Nations' definition
of "refugee" in the Refugee Act of 1980.102
Since the definition of refugee from the 1951 Convention is now included in United States law, Sanctuary workers believe that by refusing
to apply this definition to Salvadorans and Guatemalans, the United
States is violating its own, as well as international, law.103 An even more
convincing argument is that, in adopting the United Nations' definition of
refugee, Congress manifested the intent to abide by these international
treaties. If that is the case, then the United States is violating international law by refusing to recognize that Central Americans fit the definition of refugee. In order to avoid violating the law, INS would be forced
to label these individuals as refugees and grant them asylum, as mandated by 8 U.S.C. § 1158.104 By deporting Central Americans back to
their native countries, the United States would also be violating the treaties' condition that refugees not be returned to territories where they fear
persecution.10 5
B. InternationalLaw as a Defense in the Sanctuary Cases
The government's answer to the violation of international law argument is that United States' law, and only United States law, controls immigration and the policies of asylum.'0 0 The laws said to be controlling
are the Refugee Act of 1980 and the Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA").0 7 These laws allow refugee status to be granted at the discretion of the United States Attorney General.0 8
The Refugee Act and the INA do not have to be viewed as being in
opposition to international law, as demonstrated by the adoption of the
refugee definition by the Refugee Act. While courts are willing to recog100. A self-executing treaty is a treaty in which the intent to make the treaty part of the
contracting party's law is manifested. See Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States § 141 comment a (1965).
101. Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 680; Schmidt, supra note 16, at 92.
102. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections

of 8 U.S.C.).
103. E.g., Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 680.

104. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1988).
105. See 1951 Convention, art. 33, 19 U.S.T. at 6276, T.I.A.S. No. 6755 at 54, 189
U.N.T.S. at 176; Cox, supra note 98, at 376-77.
106. Merkt, 794 F.2d at 964, n.16; Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1581; Schmidt, supra note 16, at
93.
107. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524; see Altemus, supra
note 33, at 691.
108. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
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nize the treaties, decisions of asylum remain within the Attorney General's discretion. 10 9 One possible way to combine both sets of law would
be to use the United Nation's requirement of a "well-founded fear of persecution" as the prima facie case an alien must establish in order to get
his case to a jury. This process was alluded to in Merkt II, where the
court held that even if the aliens were refugees under international law,
they still had to prove their refugee status according to United States law
and the discretion of the Attorney General. 110
The government may still alter the meaning of the United Nations documents in its interpretation of the refugee definition. One of the INS's
arguments has been that the warfare which causes the type of persecution
described in the United Nations documents is not the "civil unrest" currently occurring in Central America."' As in the exclusion of testimony
regarding living conditions in El Salvador and Guatemala, this obstacle
can only be overcome by instilling in the American public an awareness of
these conditions.1 1' Authorities do not readily recognize these conditions
because of the inclination to think only of the people in Europe and Asia
as persecuted. 113 The 1951 Convention, in fact, was originally drafted as
a response to the cruel treatment of Jewish and other refugees during the
World War II." 4 The 1967 Protocol, however, in reaffirming the 1951
Convention, extended the world's concern to all refugees, including
Salvadorans, Guatemalans and Hondurans. 1 5 Perhaps because of the
"cold war," the United States developed a preference for helping Europeans and Asians to escape persecution.
Finally, like the necessity defense, testimony regarding the actual
109. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984). In Stevic,
the Court found that, while the Refugee Act incorporates the United Nations' definition of
refugee as having a "well-founded fear of persecution," neither the treaties, nor the Refugee
Act, dictated what standard of proof was required in establishing this well-founded fear. Id.
at 421. The defendant was a Yugoslavian citizen who desired asylum in the United States
because he feared he would be imprisoned in Yugoslavia as a known member of an anticommunist group. Id. at 409-10. The Court held that the defendant's showing that he met
the 1951 Convention's definition of refugee was not sufficient to obligate the United States
to prevent his deportation. Id. at 422-24. The Court, noting that past rulings had required
an alien to prove at least "a likelihood" of persecution, determined the standard of proof to
be one requiring the establishment of the "clear probability of persecution." Id. at 422, 430.
110. Merkt, 794 F.2d at 964.
111. Comment, An Analysis, supra note 18, at 1234.
112. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 16 (far more European and Asian refugees are granted asylum than
Central Americans).
114. Altemus, supra note 33, at 688.

115. The 1951 Convention applied its definition of refugee to those who suffered as a
result of events prior to January 1, 1951. 1951 Convention, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6261, T.I.A.S.
No. 6577 at 39, 189 U.N.T.S. at 152. The 1967 Protocol explicitly removed this date limitation in its reaffirmation of the 1951 Convention. 1967 Protocol, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6225,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577 at 3, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268.
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events in Central America is necessary for international law to aid the
Sanctuary Movement. Even if a court does allow the "well-founded fear
of persecution" definition to be argued, the most effective method for an
alien to establish his fear is to discuss the cruelties he has already seen.
Eliminating this evidence, as was done in Aguilar,116 makes it virtually
117
impossible for an alien to establish his refugee status.
116. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
117. There are two other international documents which also apply to the situation of the
Central American refugees. The first is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10,
1948, U.N.G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), reprinted in B. WESTON, R.
FALK, & A. D'AMATO, BAsIc DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 161, 162
(1980). Relevant portions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights include:
Art. 3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person.
Art. 5. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Art. 9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.
Art. 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the
borders of each State. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his
own, and to return to his country.
Art. 14. (1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum
from persecution.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 3, 5, 9, 13, 14.
The second document is the United Nations Convention for the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
Relevant portions of this Convention are:
ARTICLE 3
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be
bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith,
sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are
and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect
to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and persons, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
ARTICLE 17
The Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to conclude local agreements for the
removal from besieged or encircled areas, of wounded, sick, infirm, and aged persons,
children and maternity cases, and for the passage of ministers of all religions, medical
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V.

A.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

General Application of Freedom of Religion

The final defense available to Sanctuary workers that this Note will
examine is freedom of religion.1 ' The United States Supreme Court first
fashioned a test to determine the extent of one's freedom to act according
to religious beliefs in Sherbert v. Verner."' In Verner, a Seventh Day
Adventist was fired from her job because she refused to work on Saturdays, the day she celebrated as the Sabbath. 120 The South Carolina Unemployment Commission declared her ineligible to receive unemployment
compensation because she had not demonstrated good cause for refusing
the work offered to her. 12' The Supreme Court ultimately held the Unemployment Commission's decision unconstitutional122because it violated the
employee's right to exercise freedom of religion.
In developing its test, the Court first examined whether a burden was
personnel and medical equipment on their way to such areas.
ARTICLE 27
Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons,
their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their
manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and
public curiosity.
Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.
ARTICLE 32
The High Contracting Parties specifically agree that each of them is prohibited
from taking any measure of such a character as to cause the physical suffering or
extermination of protected persons in their hands. This prohibition applies not only
to murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation and medical or scientific experiments not necessitated by the medical treatment of a protected person, but also to
any other measures of brutality whether applied by civilian or military agents.
United Nations Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, arts. 3,
17, 27, 32, 6 U.S.T. at 3518-20, 3530, 3536, 3538, T.I.A.S. No. 3365 at 4-6, 16, 22, 24, 75
U.N.T.S. at 289-90, 300, 306, 308.
118. See generally J. BARRON, C. DIENES, W. MCCORMACK & M. REDISH, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 1073 (3d ed. 1987) (overview of freedom of religion cases and
issues); Comment, The Expanded Jurisprudenceof the Religion Clauses: Will the Sanctuary Movement Benefit?, 21 GONz. L. REV. 177 (1985-86) [hereinafter Comment, The Expanded Jurisprudence] (examination of historical applications of freedom of religion

clause); Note, En El Nombre De Dios-The Sanctuary Movement: Development and Potential for FirstAmendment Protection,89 W. VA. L. REV. 191 (1986-87) [hereinafter Note,
En El Nombre] (applying freedom of religion issues to sanctuary cases).
119. 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see J. BARRON, C. DIENES, W. MCCORMACK & M. REDISH, supra

note 118, at 1134-35; Comment, supra note 10, at 153; Note, En El Nombre, supra note 118,
at 210.
120. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399.
121. Id. at 401.
122. Id. at 410.
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placed upon some sincere personal belief in a religion. 2 3 The Court found
that there was a burden on the individual fired because she could not
observe her religion's Sabbath and still be entitled to the same unemploy12 4
ment compensation as any non-Seventh Day Adventist would be.
Once the plaintiff had established that there was a burden placed upon
her religious activity, the Court then looked to the second portion of its
new test. It required proof of a competing interest which required the
government to violate the individual's religious freedom. 12 5 South Carolina argued its competing interest was to prohibit persons from taking
advantage of unemployment resources by refusing to accept gainful employment.1 26 The third prong of the test required the state to establish
that it had no alternative to infringing on the right to religious freedom
mandated by the Constitution. South Carolina failed this prong of the
17
test.
After Verner, the Supreme Court modified this three-prong test in
Wisconsin v. Yoder."" In Yoder, an Amish group had been charged with
violating Wisconsin's mandatory education statute by withdrawing their
children from public schools."29 The Amish religion required practitioners
to educate their children at home."' The Court applied the three prongs
of the Verner test, but modified the second prong. Not only must the
state demonstrate a competing interest, but it also must prove a compelling, overriding interest. 1'
Having withstood many subsequent examinations, the test to determine a violation of an individual's freedom of religion still requires: (1)
the plaintiff's showing of a burden imposed on the practice of his religion,
(2) the state's demonstration of a compelling, overriding state interest,
and (3) the absence of a reasonable alternative action the state could
2
choose to limit the infringement on the individual."
123. Id. at 403-04.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 406; see Comment, The Expanded Jurisprudence,supra note 118, at 189-90;
Note, En El Nombre, supra note 118, at 210-11.
126. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-07.
127. Id. at 407-09; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .
128. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
129. Id. at 207-09.
130. Id. at 207-12.
131. Id. at 214; see Note, En El Nombre, supra note 118, at 210-11.
132. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (government's interest in preventing fraud in
welfare programs was a compelling interest which allowed it to give a Social Security number to an American Indian despite her parents' protests that it took away her spirit); Leary
v. United States, 383 F.2d. 851 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 6 (1969)
(governmental interest in controlling possession, distribution and use of marijuana overrode
individual's desire to use it in his Hindu religious experiences); see also Comment, The
Expanded Jurisprudence, supra note 118, at 189-90; Comment, Constitutional
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Freedom of Religion as a Defense in the Sanctuary Cases

Freedom to act according to religious beliefs was used as a defense in
Elder,1 33 Merkt II,"1 and Aguilar."35 In Elder, the defense filed a motion
to dismiss based on Elder's freedom of religion."' The court, applying the
Verner/Yoder test, determined that Elder met his initial burden by testi7
fying that aiding anyone in need was a basic tenet of Christianity."1
Elder, therefore, established the burden to his religious freedom created
by the government's refusal to allow him to aid Salvadoran refugees. The
government, however, successfully established its overriding interest by
demonstrating Congress' intent to control8 entry into this country via its
propagation of immigration regulations."3
While Elder was able to meet at least the first prong of the three-step
test, he and Stacey Merkt were less successful with the freedom of religion defense in Merkt II. In that case, the court was not convinced that 8
U.S.C. § 1324"11 created a burden upon religion. 14 0 The court reasoned
that the statute was neutral on its face and did not mention religion.' 4
Law-Freedom of Religion Is' Not a Valid Defense for Sanctuary Movement Workers-United States v. Merkt, 11 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 173, 177-78 (1987) [hereinafter
Comment, ConstitutionalLaw].
Individual issues in the VernerlYoder test have arisen. What constitutes a burden to religious practices is one such issue. "Blue laws" were challenged in 1961 because they prohibited the opening of stores on Sundays. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, (1961). An Orthodox Jew challenged the laws as unconstitutional because Sunday was not his Sabbath. Id. at
601. Since Saturday is the orthodox Jewish Sabbath, the petitioner was losing business on
both days of the weekend. The Court held, however, that the "blue laws" treated all religions equally by not allowing anyone to do business on a Sunday, and that the economic
loss suffered by Orthodox Jews was not an unconstitutional burden to religious freedom. Id.
at 605.
The definition of religion has also been challenged. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437
(1971); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965). All three of these cases concerned individuals who chose a conscientious objector
status in the Vietnam War, because of religious beliefs. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 439; Welsh, 398
U.S. at 335; Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166. In Welsh and Seeger, the Court allowed objector status
based on religious beliefs in ethical, moral, and superior duties, even though neither Welsh
nor Seeger believed in a superior being. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340-41; Seeger, 380 U.S. at 173,
176. In Gillette, however, the Court held that an objection to one particular war was not a
religious belief sufficiently significant to invoke the First Amendment right to choose conscientious objector status. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 441-48.
133. United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574, 1576-77 (S.D. Tex. 1985).
134. United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 954 (5th Cir. 1986).
135. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom.
Socorro Pardo v. United States, 59 U.S.L.W. 3481 (1991).
136. Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1576-77.
137. Id. at 1577.
138. Id. at 1578, 1580.
139. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1988) prohibits aiding aliens.
140. Merkt, 794 F.2d at 956.
141. Id.
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The court also stated that the statute did not infringe on the defendants'
freedom to act according to religious beliefs because other means could
have been chosen to help Central Americans. 142 The court in Merkt II
completed its examination of the case under VernerlYoder standards and
determined that controlling alien entry is an overriding state interest " 3
and that there was no less burdensome
alternative for the government
144
than to arrest the Sanctuary workers.

In Aguilar, the defense moved for a dismissal based on freedom of religion. 5 The court relied directly on Merkt I and held that (1) the defense failed to establish a burden on religion; (2) the patrol of United
States borders was a compelling state interest;
and (3) there was no less
46
restrictive alternative available to the state.
Commentators disagree on whether Sanctuary workers can successfully
use a freedom of religion defense. 47 The change in the courts' beliefs that
a religious act or belief was violated in Elder, but was not violated one
year later in Merkt II, suggests that the Sanctuary workers cannot meet
this prong of the three-step test, and therefore cannot rely on the freedom of religion defense. The critical problem with meeting this first
prong is that the government has continually asserted that the movement
is not religious, but is just another form of political
protest against the
4 s
United States' involvement in Central America.
The second prong remains an obstacle for Sanctuary workers as long as
courts believe that keeping refugees from crossing American borders is a
compelling state interest. This interest will continue to be labeled "compelling" as long as the conditions in El Salvador and Guatemala remain
virtually unknown. If actual conditions were made known, Sanctuary
workers would be able to make a better argument that this country's interest in turning away a few thousand refugees does not override a commitment to protect them from death and torture until they can return to
142. Id. These other means included providing bond money, housing and food to aliens
who were awaiting an immigration hearing-the very reasons which the Sanctuary Movement was started. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
143. Merkt, 794 F.2d at 955-56.
144. Id. at 956-57.
145. Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 694.
146. Id. at 694-95.
147. Compare Comment, supra note 10 (suggesting arguments Sanctuary workers could
use in establishing a freedom of religion defense) and Comment, The Expanded Jurisprudence, supra note 118 (suggesting modern freedom of religion provides enough protection to
defend Sanctuary Movement) with Comment, Constitutional Law, supra note 132 (suggesting Sanctuary workers cannot successfully meet the three prong test) and Note, En El
Nombre, supra note 118 (suggesting government's interest is believed to be too compelling
for defense to work in Sanctuary cases).
148. Note, En El Nombre, supra note 118, at 213. But cf. supra note 20 (Rev. John Fife
stressed that the Sanctuary Movement is a religious, not a political, one.).
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Central America.
The prosecution has consistently established the third prong by showing that the State has no reasonable alternative to prosecuting the Sanctuary workers for aiding aliens. Until 1990, it was true that the government had no other alternative, since aiding aliens is a crime. However, on
November 29, 1990, Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality
Act and created the Immigration Act of 1990.1"9 Under this amended act,
refugees from El Salvador may no longer be considered aliens, so aiding
them may no longer be a crime. One section provides for a "temporary
protected status," which the attorney general may extend to aliens from
certain countries. 150 The next section explicitly names El Salvador as one
of those countries. 5 '
While achieving "temporary protected status" requires the alien to
have lived in the United States for a certain amount of time and mandates a procedure for gaining this status, 52 it is a preferable alternative
to prosecuting Sanctuary workers. With this alternative, Sanctuary workers may be able to finally prove the third prong of the freedom of religion
defense.
VI.

CONCLUSION AND PREDICTIONS

One report states that United States aid to El Salvador totalled $1.4
million per day in January, 1990,153 and yet the cruelty continues. A

small, but growing number of United States citizens have given their
homes, food, advice, and freedom to individuals from El Salvador. For a
number of Central Americans, these gifts, condemned by the United
States government, have done far more to alleviate the suffering than any
amount of governmental aid.
149. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990). This legislation follows two bills which

were originally introduced in 1986. Committee on the Judiciary, Temporary Stay of Deportation for Certain Salvadorans, H.R. 755, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1986); H.R. 822, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
150. Pub. L. No. 101-649 § 302, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 244A).
This provision states that the Attorney General may designate a foreign state whose aliens
may attain temporary protected status in the United States if
(A) the Attorney General finds that there is an ongoing armed conflict within the
state and, due to such conflict, requiring the return of aliens who are nationals of that
state to that state ... would pose a serious threat to their personal safety
...or
(C) the Attorney General finds that there exist extraordinary and temporary conditions in the foreign state that prevent aliens who are nationals of the state from returning to the state in safety. ...
Id. (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 244A(b)(1)(A)-(C)).
151. Id. at Sec. 303(a)(1).
152. Id. at Sec. 302 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. §244A(c)(1)(A)-(B)).
153. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1990, at All, col, 1.
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INS, at first claiming no threat from the Sanctuary Movement, 1 54 is
now fully prosecuting workers and infiltrating churches to do so. 1 55 The
Sanctuary Movement does not have as an objective the relocation of all
Salvadoran citizens permanently into the United States. Their goal is to
help each individual refugee from Central America to escape the threats
of death and torture, prevalent in the daily lives of many there. By doing
so, the Sanctuary workers have created their own, religiously based asylum. They would prefer not to break any laws. They would prefer that
the INS and the Attorney General grant temporary asylum to these
refugees."' 6
The government, however, has effectively established its interest in policing the entry of any alien. It has convinced INS officials, federal judges,
and a majority of the American public that Central Americans desire to
live in the United States for economic, not political, reasons. 57 The refugees brought into the country by Sanctuary workers are not reaping any
economic benefits. They are hiding in churches and homes, borrowing
clothes, and losing family members and friends left behind.
A governmental interest in regulating admission of immigrants is a
valid interest, but many exceptions have been made, creating refugee status for political reasons. Salvadorans and Guatemalans cannot establish
that they are escaping political oppression as long as they cannot present
the true conditions in El Salvador and Guatemala. If these conditions
were disclosed in testimony in the Sanctuary trials, the necessity defense
could be successful. The requirement that a greater evil is prevented
would be established since that greater evil is death and torture.
The international law defenses might also succeed, or at least be argued, since the presentation of any international law violations by the
United States was also prohibited along with the prohibition of evidence
concerning conditions in Central America. Again, the presentation of the
conditions would allow the refugees to establish their political refugee
status, and the international treaties would apply to them.
Finally, if conditions in Central America could be accurately depicted
at trial, the interest of the state in a freedom of religion defense would no
longer be 'deemed compelling in light of the harsh alternative of sending
the refugees back to Central America.
The defenses of necessity, international law and freedom of religion
have failed repeatedly for Sanctuary workers. Courts are bound to adhere
to the laws enacted by Congress and have now created precedents for
these defenses to fail in Sanctuary cases. Relief, then, must come through
154.
155.
156.
157.

See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra

note 29.
text accompanying notes 47-48.
note 27 and accompanying text.
note 16 and accompanying text.
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the legislative branch supported by the public. The plight of Central
Americans is slowly creeping into the public's view.
American courts have refused to recognize the torturous conditions in
Central America. This refusal has eliminated the effectiveness of three
very important defenses; necessity, international law, and freedom of religion. While the judicial system remains blind to the refugees' plight, the
public and its representatives have begun to realizd the severity of the
situation. Sanctuary workers, who saw the problem many years ago and
began an effective campaign to alleviate it, have now been joined in their
awareness. 15 The clearest evidence of the growing awareness of the oppressive conditions in Central America is the Immigration Act of 1990,
which may eventually make the Sanctuary Movement no longer
necessary.
Karen E. Lavarnway

158. Congressman Joe Moakley and Peter Rodino were joined in urging Congress to pass
the recent legislation by members of the American Civil Liberties Union, the Church World
Service, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, and other members of the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and International
Law, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and International Law, Committee on the
Judiciary, Hearing on the Temporary Suspension of Deportation for Nationals of Certain
Countries. H.R. REP. No. 822, at 1-2, 47-54, 68-74.
Cities declaring themselves sanctuaries include Berkeley, California; Madison, Wisconsin;
and Los Angeles, California. City Sanctuary Resolutions and the Preemption Doctrine:
Much Ado About Nothing, 20 Loy. LA.L. REv. 513, 516-17 (1987). Two states which have
declared themselves states of refuge are New York and New Mexico. Survey of Recent Litigation, supra note 26, at 222. See also Anaya, Sanctuary: Because There are Still Many
Who Wait for Death, 15 HOPSTRA L. REv. 101 (1986) (discussing the need for cities and
states to become sanctuaries). The author of this previously cited article, Toney Anaya, was
the governor of New Mexico from January 1983 to December 1986. In 1986, he issued a
proclamation making New Mexico the first state to declare itself a sanctuary. Id. at 101-02.

